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The World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement
system is intended to be the central pillar of the international trade
system by which trade disputes involving WTO member states are ad-
judicated,1 whether regarding trade in goods, services, or in intellec-
tual property rights.2  However, an innocuous statement such as this,
when closely considered, indicates potential problems for the system.
The WTO is an international treaty-based organization, established in
* J.D. candidate, 2010, University of Richmond School of Law.
1 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes A
Unique Contribution, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.
htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
2 See Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1154 (1994); General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 I.L.M. 1125,
1167 (1994); Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1197 (1994).
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1994 by 123 countries in Marrakesh, Morocco.3  In addition to settling
disputes in international trade, the WTO is also a negotiating forum
and a set of rules.4  The organization is more than a “table” for its
member states, as the WTO website implies: the set of rules includes
common principles, which translate into purposes for the organiza-
tion.5  These include non-discrimination (i.e., treating domestic prod-
ucts no more favorably than imported products), free trade,
predictability, fair competition, and the encouragement of economic
development.6
Yet, as a voluntary political organization, any judicial enforce-
ment of its actions will not come without controversy.7  Thus, the dis-
pute settlement mechanism of the WTO cannot act in a traditional
judicial sense since such judicial decisions are binding only because
autonomous member states have agreed that they be binding.8  Even
the process by which the system was established was inherently politi-
cal, and such politics are expected to, and do, permeate the system’s
functioning.9
The WTO functions with an understanding of its own limita-
tions.  The dispute settlement mechanism’s actions are administrative
and decided by a system of arbitration.  It is not an international
equivalent of a domestic common (or civil) law court, but an economic
creation with a political end.  Considering the natural autonomy of its
members and the ends of the organization, including the disposal of
disputes, natural inequities will not be easily resolved.  If the WTO
intends to pursue its stated principles, then it should be aware of these
natural inequities and appropriately deal with them.10  This is the
problem of fairness, and it reveals itself in the dispute settlement
3 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Uruguay Round, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2010) [hereinafter Uruguay Round].
4 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: What is the WTO?, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2010).
5 Id.
6 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading
System, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2010).
7 Debra P. Steger, The Future of the WTO:  The Case for Institutional Reform, 12
J. INT’L. ECON. L. 803, 803–04 (2009).
8 Id. at 806.
9 Id.
10 Chad P. Bown & Bernard M. Hoekman, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Miss-
ing Developing Country Cases:  Engaging the Private Sector, 8 J. INT’L. ECON. L.
861, 862 (2005), available at http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/4/
861?ijkey=sctstP41iBTuveY&keytype=ref (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
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mechanism, particularly in the treatment of developed versus develop-
ing nations.
The system as it stands intends simply to “deal with” natural
inequities within the system, mitigating unfair advantages, rather
than structuring the system so that inequities do not translate into
advantage and disadvantage.11  The Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing (“DSU”), the guiding document for the dispute settlement system,
allows for “special procedures involving least-developed country mem-
bers” in certain areas.12  Philosophically, the DSU reveals intent to
balance two competing tendencies, egalitarian liberalism and liberta-
rian liberalism, in trying to reach an optimal agreement for the system
to function.  An examination of this system reveals problems and the
need for a solution.
I. THE SYSTEM AS IT STANDS
A. The WTO Dispute Settlement System
The DSU, signed on April 15, 1994, along with other docu-
ments, decisions, and understandings, was part of the finalizing act of
the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations.13  The Uruguay Round,
named for the country in which the first meeting was held in 1986,
was the set of trade negotiations that formally created the WTO.14
The idea for the Uruguay Round began in 1982 at a ministerial meet-
ing of GATT members in Geneva.15  Up to that point, the organization
had been called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, or
GATT, and its jurisdiction extended only to trade in goods.16  With the
establishment of the WTO, the organization agreed to negotiate trade
in other areas, particularly in services and intellectual property.17  Po-
litically, the organization was restructured, and the dispute settle-
11 See generally Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dis-
pute Settlement, 9 CHI. KENT. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 130 (describing why developing
countries shy away from participating in disputes or are unable to access the dis-
pute settlement system).
12 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 2, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125
(1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/28-dsu_e.htm [here-
inafter DSU].
13 Uruguay Round, supra note 3.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_
e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
17 Uruguay Round, supra note 3.
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ment system underwent changes as prescribed by the DSU.18  Under
GATT, dispute settlement was largely another negotiation function of
the body, and decisions were products of political capital.19  That pro-
cess was based on diplomacy, and the system that emerged from the
DSU was rule-based.20  Particularly, decisions made were automati-
cally binding, and countries were given an automatic right of review to
the Appellate Body.21  Such measures were intended to be helpful to
developing nations who had less to bargain with in terms of political or
economic capital under the GATT system.
By partially judicializing the system, the WTO “table,” at least
as far as dispute settlement matters relating to developing countries,
was thought to have been made more equitable.  Although such mea-
sures wrongly assumed developing nations would be willing to use the
system to resolve their trade disputes, the DSU’s new measures can be
viewed as an attempt to mitigate natural inequities.  It assumes that if
efforts are taken to put developing nations in the same place at the
beginning of a dispute as developed nations, they have no reason to act
differently.  There are two problems that arise in evaluating the fair-
ness of the dispute settlement system as it stands.  First, it does not do
enough to fully mitigate obstacles developing nations face when enter-
ing the international trade regime.  Second, its philosophical under-
pinnings do not allow it to alleviate more essential problems, including
the problem of participation and the consequences that result from the
way trade disputes work out for developing nations, given their special
circumstances.  If the system is reformed according to a legal pragma-
tism model, basing its function on a non-philosophical and goal-ori-
ented meaning of fairness and targeting those more essential issues
(particularly participation), secondary issues will take care of
themselves.
B. Developing Nation Special and Differential Treatment
The DSU gives “special and differential treatment” to develop-
ing nations in a number of ways.  These privileges occur at various
stages of the dispute resolution process and are intended to alleviate
some of the problems that naturally occur for developing nations, in-
cluding the lack of experts on particular trade issues and the long-
18 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, The GATT Years: From
Havana to Marrakesh, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_
e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
19 Timothy Stostad, Note, Trappings of Legality: Judicialization of Dispute Settle-
ment in the WTO, and Its Impact on Developing Countries, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J.
811, 812 (2006).
20 Id.
21 Id.
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term financial strain of dedicating resources to resolving disputes.22
First, the DSU provides for special and differential treatment during
consultations.  This is the first stage of the dispute resolution process,
where parties are required to negotiate a resolution to the dispute
before a panel is involved.  The DSU instructs members (of the WTO)
to give “special attention” to the particular problems and interest of
developing countries if they are involved in the dispute.23  The parties
are required to indicate on a form exactly how these special considera-
tions were made.  The DSU also provides two ways that the period for
consultation may extend beyond its normal length of sixty days:24  The
parties may mutually agree to extend the period or the Dispute Settle-
ment Body (“DSB”) chairperson may extend the period.25
Normally, the panel stage comes after consultation, assuming
parties are not able to reach a consensus on how to dispose of the dis-
pute.  The DSB, comprised of all members of the WTO, has the author-
ity to establish panels to hear disputes.  If a developing country is a
party to the dispute, at least one of the three panel members must be
from a developing country.26  If the respondent is a developing coun-
try, the DSU instructs the panel to ensure the nation has sufficient
time to prepare and present its defense, though there is no provision
for the time period provided to be extended.27  The panel is required to
explicitly indicate on a form if a developing nation raises issues of spe-
cial and differential treatment and how consideration was made.28
Special and differential treatment also extends to the imple-
mentation stage after the panel has reached a decision.  Implementa-
tion includes guaranteeing that the “losing” party acts upon the
panel’s decision as well as the withdrawal of violative trade mecha-
nisms, compensation for loss, and, as a last resort, the suspension of
an obligation of the opposing party equivalent to the loss of that party
as was adjudged by the dispute body.29  Here again, the DSU requires
special consideration be given to issues of developing nations.30  The
DSB is required to give consideration to the way implementation is
22 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: De-
veloping Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement, http://www.wto.int/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s1p1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
23 DSU, supra note 12, art. 4.10.
24 Id. art. 4.7.
25 Id. art. 12.10.
26 Id. art. 8.10.
27 Id. art. 12.10.
28 Id. art. 12.11.
29 Id. art. 3.7.
30 Id. art. 21.2.
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managed in a developing nation, what measures would be appropriate,
and their impact on the member state’s economy.31
The previously mentioned provisions are primarily intended
for developing nations that are respondents in a dispute and need ad-
ditional time to defend themselves.  When developing nations are com-
plainants, they have the right to invoke Article 3.12, which allows for
accelerated procedures through the entire process as prescribed by the
WTO decision of April 5, 1966.32  These special procedures allow for
additional considerations available to developing nations, including
post-consultation dispute facilitation by the WTO Director-General,
the consideration of special circumstances of the developing nation at
the panel stage, and a shortened time period for the panel to submit its
report.33
Beyond these provisions, additional allowances are set out in
the DSU for the least-developed countries.  Special circumstances
must be considered at all stages, not just at the panel and implementa-
tion stages, and developed states are urged to use restraint in seeking
compensation.34  The Director-General must also be available at all
stages of the dispute settlement process to consult and facilitate equi-
table resolutions.35
Finally, the WTO provides assistance for developing countries’
lack of legal expertise. The organization Secretariat provides legal as-
sistance because they are required to provide developing nations a le-
gal expert if requested.36  But, there are conflict of interest issues, and
therefore, limitations for WTO employees consulting for developing
nations, so the WTO allows for private legal counsel to be employed in
cases of a dispute.37  The WTO also has established the Advisory Cen-
tre on WTO Law, an agency independent from the WTO that can pro-
vide assistance in dispute matters.38
31 Id. arts. 21.7–21.8.
32 Decision of 5 April 1966 on Procedures under Article XXII, GATT B.I.S.D. (14th
Supp.) at 18 (1967).
33 Id.
34 DSU, supra note 12, art. 24.1.
35 Id. art. 24.2.
36 Id. art. 27.2.
37 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module: De-
veloping Countries in Dispute Settlement—Special and Differential Treatment,
http://www.wto.int/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c11s2p2_e.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
38 Id.
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II. IS THE SYSTEM FAIR?
Do these provisions serve their purpose?  The intent of this spe-
cial and differential treatment of developing nations is to mitigate nat-
ural, and thus “unfair,” advantages of developed nations.  If the goal is
to make the proceedings fair, or as fair as possible, then what do we
mean by fair?  Are there external goals to be accomplished by fairness?
Traditionally, the fairness of these provisions has been evaluated us-
ing the opposing standards of egalitarian liberalism and libertarian
liberalism.
Why liberalism?  WTO academic study has all but assumed
that “liberal” would be an appropriate philosophical characterization
of the organization and its purpose.  When considering the issue of
fairness of the dispute resolution mechanism, the characterization
takes on a strikingly more active meaning than might be assumed.
Scholars have viewed liberalism, in this context, as a “theory of justice,
a view about the justifications of social arrangements.”39  What justifi-
cations are appropriate would then be the main point of contention
between differing views of liberalism, particularly egalitarian and lib-
ertarian liberalism.40  The form of this justification would take that of
the consent of the governed, following a social contract theory.  To
what have the people agreed,41 or, in the case of the WTO, to what
have the members agreed?  This is what the philosophical approaches
strive to answer.
The two approaches have been criticized, however, on several
grounds.  By evaluating fairness using a philosophical standard, there
is a natural presumption of neutrality as to any favoring of developed
or developing states.42  The philosophical approaches also do not con-
sistently take into account the consequences of WTO actions by its
members.43
A. What is Fair?
1. Egalitarian and Libertarian Liberalism
Egalitarian liberalism stands on one end of the spectrum in
evaluating what it means for the WTO dispute settlement system to be
fair concerning the special treatment of developing nations.  This eval-
39 Frank J. Garcia, Trade and Inequality: Economic Justice and the Developing
World, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 975, 996 (1999).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 JAMES GATHII, FAIRNESS AS FIDELITY TO MAKING THE WTO FULLY RESPONSIVE
TO ALL ITS MEMBERS 1, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=594485.
43 Id.
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uation originates from the thought of John Rawls, an American philos-
opher, and would see the benefits and burdens of the trading system
equally disbursed, bearing in mind what Rawls called the “difference
principle,” which would give special consideration to vulnerable mem-
bers.44  This principle, derived from his thought that inequitable dis-
tribution of what he called “social primary goods,” was not justified
and must be undone.45  Thus, the egalitarian liberal approach would
favor developing nations in doling out benefits and burdens, eliminat-
ing any natural advantages of developed nations and disadvantages of
developing nations.  The approach appears ends-focused, considering
non-trade issues that might affect a developing country’s ability to re-
spond to a dispute settlement proceeding.46  Members are thus viewed
as rights holders, not just economic bodies.47  The egalitarian liberal
would demand that developing nations receive equal benefits in the
end.  The current system would be criticized for not doing enough to
mandate removal of all advantages of developed nations.  Frank Gar-
cia, an egalitarian proponent, notes, “[I]f . . . the principle of special
and differential treatment is key to the justification of inequality, then
adequate implementation of the principle . . . is equally important for
the creation of a just trading system.”48  The opportunity to succeed is
not justice or fairness; success is.
Libertarian liberalism, on the other hand, considers WTO
members solely economic beings, and considerations are all self-con-
tained.49  Non-trade issues are not considered in dispensing fairness.50
Rather than being ends-focused, libertarian liberalism demands fair-
ness be accomplished by procedural equality and by equality of oppor-
tunity.51  This is because morality to the libertarian is a matter of
rights, not of equality.52  Rights would demand a return of developing
and developed nations to their original positions, not their end posi-
tions as egalitarianism might demand, because it is not equality itself
that is in need of repair; it is the right to equality and the opportunity
of equality, not the guarantee of it.  In looking at the WTO, the liberta-
rian liberal would believe that developing nations should have the
right to compete equally with developed nations, not the guarantee of
44 Id. at 2. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press
1972).
45 Garcia, supra note 39, at 998.
46 GATHII, supra note 42, at 2.
47 Id.
48 Garcia, supra note 39, at 1042.
49 GATHII, supra note 42, at 3.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Garcia, supra note 39, at 1007.
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or right to equal results.  Thus, a proponent would favor ways the de-
veloping nation could better its position if it so chooses.53
In practice, the two philosophies lead the WTO dispute resolu-
tion mechanism to be crafted in two directions.  Egalitarian liberalism
so benefits developing nations that it eliminates any incentive to de-
velop further economically because, in the end, all nations are on the
same level.  Libertarian liberalism does not consider external factors
that show up in the consequences of a WTO action, and nations are not
able to preemptively act to avoid disputes.  Thus, both philosophies
blind the actors to an extent, and a position of compromise would sim-
ply result in equalizing disadvantages and advantages.  The problem
is that balancing advantages and disadvantages needs to be done sub-
jectively, on a case-by-case basis, but such a structural balance must
be set out objectively.
The consequences of the problem of philosophical approaches
can be illustrated by the following situation.  Philosophical depen-
dence has left a gaping hole in WTO treaty interpretation; there is no
judicial precedent for a rule for the DSB.54  The Appellate Body has
adopted a rule, in dubio mitius, or “the less onerous meaning controls,”
but it would only apply if a case were reviewed on the point.55  As a
result, the DSB has had no guidance in interpreting treaty language,
and the Appellate Body is left with a broad rule with questionable ap-
plication.  Both bodies’ decisions have led to contradictions, including
in the case of Article Fifteen of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
The Agreement, an implementation of the GATT Treaty in
1994, left open the question of whether developed nations must imple-
ment alternate measures against a developing country before applying
anti-dumping duties.56  The agreement says: “Possibilities of construc-
tive remedies provided for by this Agreement shall be explored before
applying anti-dumping duties where they would affect the essential
interests of developing country Members.”57  In a 2002 decision
against the United States, the Panel found that Article Fifteen did not
impose any “specific or general obligation on Members to undertake
any particular action.”58  This is an example of a “disempowering char-
acterization”59 that finds a violation based on a non-trade issue, where
53 Id. at 1042.
54 GATHII, supra note 42, at 6.
55 Id.; see also Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, ¶ 107, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
56 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
57 Id.
58 Panel Report, United States—Antidumping and Countervailing Measures on
Steel Plate From India, ¶ 7.110, WT/DS206/R (June 28, 2002).
59 GATHII, supra note 42, at 8.
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an alternate interpretation would not have found one.  Despite the in
dubio mitius precedent, the disempowering characterization approach
has become the more commonplace interpretation.  In a 2000 case in-
volving the European Union and India, however, a panel found other-
wise, requiring the European Union to explore potential outcomes of
implementing alternatives to anti-dumping duties.60  It did not con-
firm the existence of an actual duty under which a violation could be
brought.61  Even assuming that the lack of clear judicial precedent has
not yielded contradiction in this case, a reconciling view is not much
comfort.  The lack of a clear judicial precedent renders a measure at-
tempting to assist developing nations entirely impotent.
2. Legal Pragmatism: Theory, Purpose, and Practice
If the two WTO decisions are indeed without contradiction and
are attempting to reach a middle ground, the dependence upon war-
ring philosophies has resulted in policies that fail to assist developing
nations, yet still create additional hurdles through which developed
nations must jump.  Essentially, the WTO has perfected finding the
unhappy medium, one that is both unfair and ineffective.  The philo-
sophical approach has resulted in simply mitigating inequities so long
as they do not overly burden the other side, and has thus failed to
remedy root problems.  A pragmatic approach, whose goal is to make a
system that performs at a predictable and efficient level, stands as an
alternative to a philosophically-guided approach.  Rather than trying
to reconcile opposing philosophical views and producing policies, laws
and standards that are the sum of all equals, a pragmatic approach
would be free to embrace an entirely egalitarian consideration of non-
trade issues without mandating the employment of certain privileges,
a libertarian preference.
A third philosophical approach, mentioned less often, that
might be confused with legal pragmatism is utilitarianism.  Utilitari-
anism is based on the thought of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
Mill.62  Unlike egalitarianism, it advocates redistribution of inequities
based on a morality of consequence, not equality.63  Unlike libertarian-
ism, it is concerned with equality of ends, not just equality of opportu-
nity.64  However, as with egalitarianism, utilitarianism does not
satisfy a tangible goal.  Legal pragmatism recognizes that the two
60 Panel Report, European Communities—Antidumping Duties on Imports of Cot-
ton-Type Bed Linen from India, WT/DS141/R (Oct. 30, 2000).
61 Id.
62 See Garcia, supra note 39, at 1002–03.
63 Id. at 1003.
64 Id. at 1007.
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models often diverge, and that in such a case it would be better to
follow the latter.
B. Systematic Unevenness
Legal pragmatism must address several systematic problems
to decide whether the dispute settlement system works fairly.  The dis-
pute settlement system is underutilized because costs are too high, the
process functions opaquely, and its decisions are difficult to predict.
Legal standards are nearly impossible to articulate, as evidenced by
the Article Fifteen anti-dumping problem.65  It is harder to determine
whether issues are causes or consequences, because the system’s in-
herent problems are simultaneously mitigated and aggravated by the
“special and differential treatment” of developing nations.66  Examina-
tion of the resulting unevenness reveals a central problem, one that
should be targeted to alleviate the negative results in other issues.
1. Participation in the System
Timothy Stostad examined the impact the dispute settlement
mechanism’s level of judicialization has on developing nations’ partici-
pation in the system.67  He concludes that there is evidence of system-
atic biases within the WTO dispute resolution process that have led to
underutilization by developing nations.68  The question of utilization
of the system must examine not one year, but the trend of participa-
tion since the WTO establishment overhauled the system in 1994.
Overall, developing nations have been using the dispute resolution
system more often, though the raw numbers seem to have plateaued.
There were nineteen disputes in 2008, with developing nations as com-
plainants in eleven of those and as respondents in eight.69  This trend
was established in 2005, when developing nations participated in four
out of eleven disputes as complainant or respondent.70  For the past
four years, developing nations have participated in about half the dis-
putes, equally as complainant and respondent.  In 2004, however, de-
veloping nations comprised just over a quarter of the disputes.71  This
is striking considering about three-quarters of WTO members consider
65 See supra notes 54–61 and accompanying text.
66 See Dispute Settlement System Training Module, supra note 22.
67 Stostad, supra note 19, at 812.
68 Id. at 834.
69 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Chronological List of Disputes
Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2010).
70 Id.
71 Id. (developing nations participated as five out of nineteen complainants and
five out of nineteen respondents).
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themselves a developing nation.72  At the same time, the total number
of disputes has noticeably decreased.  In 2002, there were thirty-seven
disputes, followed by twenty-six in 2003, nineteen in 2004, eleven in
2005, and they have remained relatively stable through 2008.73
Regarding the relative increase in the participation of develop-
ing nations in the dispute system, Stostad notes that the difference
with the GATT years is actually negligible once one considers such fac-
tors as the number of WTO members, the increasing number of areas
in which the WTO regulates, and a general increased trade depen-
dency.74  Eric Posner and John C. Yoo calculated that the total number
of disputes has not increased since GATT, averaging 0.0044 com-
plaints per state per year, compared with 0.0037 complaints per state
per year under GATT, a negligible difference.75  They based their cal-
culation on the number of state pairs possible, using factorial analysis
and eliminating outlier years.76  Regarding the gross decrease in the
amount of cases since 2005, Stostad hypothesizes that nations have
been saving up disputes, anticipating new and better rules at the end
of the Doha Round of negotiation.77
If developing nations are participating at rates relatively equal
to developed nations, though both have dropped off in the past four
years, are they participating enough?  Is peaking at nearly half of
WTO cases fair considering, as a whole, they share less of a trade bur-
den than most developed nations?  The conclusion seems to be no.  De-
spite the fact that they trade less than developed nations, as three-
quarters of the WTO membership, developing nations underutilize the
WTO dispute resolution mechanism.  As a basic calculation, the costs
do not outweigh the benefits.  There are a number of reasons why this
is the case.
Naturally, the costs are comparatively higher for developing
nations.  First, in terms of human capital, developing nations are far
less represented at the WTO.78  Stostad estimates that nearly 60% of
72 World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO, Principles of the Trading
System: http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2010).
73 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement: Chronological List of Disputes
Cases, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_status_e.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 26, 2010).
74 Stostad, supra note 19, at 824.
75 Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, A Theory of International Adjudication 40 (Univ.
Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 206,
2004), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/206-eap-jy.tribunals.pdf.
76 Id.
77 Stostad, supra note 19, at 824.
78 Id. at 825.
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WTO members are inadequately represented.79  The cost of legal ser-
vices is higher per dollar (or peso or dong) for developing nations be-
cause litigation costs do not increase proportionally according to the
value of the trade barrier.80  For this reason, partially judicializing the
dispute resolution system has increased the costs on developing na-
tions, having to advance the costs of formal litigation.  Are the benefits
also higher as to counterbalance the costs?  No; in fact, they are lower
than developed nations because of the risk they will be unable to reap
the benefits of winning a dispute.  Because the implementation and
enforcement of decisions are not guaranteed, developing nations have
less political capital to force a nation in violation to comply.  Thus, it is
less likely that a developing nation will be able to benefit from a suc-
cessful dispute decision.
If these are barriers, do developing nations actually underu-
tilize the WTO dispute resolution system as a result?  The answer is
yes.  Despite the fact that the number of disputes brought by develop-
ing nations has increased, it is counterbalanced by the gross increase
in the amount of trade done by developing nations.81  Even though de-
veloping nations such as China are trading more, their disputes are
still being resolved at a lesser rate than developed nations.  “[A] large
poor country doing lots of trade is as likely to be a [disputant] as a
small rich one with the same trade value.”82  The simple dichotomy of
developing and developed nations entirely eliminates any shade of
gray, pigeonholing countries and erasing incentives for gradual
growth.  Beyond this, there is no way to determine the extent to which
developing nations are underutilizing the dispute process because
there is no external point of comparison.83
2. Transparency and Predictability of the System
There are consequences that follow underutilization as one
analyzes the fairness of the special and differential treatment of devel-
oping nations in the system.  While special and differential treatment
attempts to mitigate some of the natural problems for developing na-
tions, such as the costs of legal representation, it does not solve those
problems.  At the same time, it makes some natural inequities more
visible and more likely to affect the developing nation’s participation
in the system.  Partial judicialization of the system, as will be dis-
79 Id. at 826.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 828.
82 Peter Holmes et al., Emerging Trends in WTO Dispute Settlement: Back to the
GATT? 13 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper Series, Paper No. 3133,
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636553.
83 Stostad, supra note 19, at 831.
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cussed later, was intended to assist the developing nations with lim-
ited political capital.  Rather than eliminating the problem of limited
political capital, it instead made the problem a lack of economic
capital.
Beyond underutilization, other issues and complications arise,
particularly transparency and predictability.  As the Antidumping
Agreement Article Fifteen problem illustrates, if countries do not bring
disputes to the DSB, no judicial precedent is created.  Without judicial
precedent, countries do not know the law and cannot avoid a dispute
preemptively, the ultimate goal of the system.  It is a problem of pre-
dictability.  Without participation in the system, the system will not
become predictable.
Transparency is another complementary complication.  With-
out transparency, nations are unable to understand prior case law to
avoid disputes.  The developed nations, interestingly, have most nota-
bly pushed for transparency reform.  The United States has pushed for
the dispute resolution process to be opened to the public eye, both dur-
ing the process and after, in document requests.84  The proposal was
presented to the WTO after pressure from Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (“NGOs”) with particular concern for the issues of developing
nations, including labor and environmental rights.85  Private attor-
neys have also advocated such a change so that they can better pre-
pare for disputes.86  That is where transparency becomes
predictability.  Additionally, such change would help with the public
view of the legitimacy of the WTO, which is likely to encourage future
participation.87
III. REFORMING FAIRNESS
A. Where: Procedurally
1. Participation and Regularization
Partial judicialization is to blame for a lack of participation and
has made the dispute resolution process less accessible to poorer mem-
ber states.88  In 2006, Stostad wrote that the root of the problem of
participation lies in the limited judicialization of the dispute settle-
ment system.89  Problems for developing nations in the world of partial
judicialization include the increased complexity of the substantive law,
84 Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure: An Overview of
the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 43 (1999).
85 Id. at 44.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 46.
88 Stostad, supra note 19, at 813–14.
89 Id.
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a more formal litigation process, and extraordinary costs on the liti-
gants.90  Increased complexity of the law is a result of growing case
law that has begun to stack up as the sum of singular decisions, not in
drawing a picture of the greater law, in the common law sense.  This is
the problem with the DSB’s hesitancy to use set standards in evaluat-
ing disputes, instead depending on case-by-case compromises.  It
would not be a problem if it were not coupled with a formal process
and high costs to use the system.91  Stostad paints a picture of a schiz-
ophrenic system: an expensive, formal process that produces binding
compromises.92  The problem with participation results from the con-
fused system that only exists because the DSB is intended to compro-
mise the interests of developing and developed nations and mitigate
natural inequities.93  Philosophical compromise does not solve the
problem of nature; it aggravates it by institutionalizing new inequi-
ties. The WTO needs to address these problems to find a proper
solution.
One potential solution is full judicialization of the dispute pro-
cess.94  Full judicialization would increase the power of the DSB.  Such
a recommendation is commendable, but room remains for caution.
Judicialization should not proceed if it is merely to make the system
work like a court in the domestic common or civil law sense.  To make
the dispute settlement mechanism more effective, the WTO must ad-
dress the problems that directly affect the principle of predictability.95
A more promising solution is increased regularization of the dispute
process.  The DSB is not a court, and it does not, nor should it, dis-
pense justice; however, by regularizing legal standards and increasing
the transparency of its procedures and decisions, both developed and
developing nations may be better able to avoid disputes and trade
freer and fairer on their own.
Strengthened enforcement of the DSB’s decisions may cause
controversy.  Although the consequences of strong enforcement en-
courage nations to avoid disputes, overzealous enforcement can dis-
courage participation in the system.  If the consequences of losing a
dispute become disproportionate to the dispute itself, nations would be
encouraged to work outside of the system.  Working outside of the sys-
tem would undermine confidence in the system as a whole, and an in-
crease in cloudy, back-room deals would be adverse to the rule of law.
90 Id. at 814.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlement System Training Module:
Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement System, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c1s1p1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
94 Stostad, supra note 19, at 834.
95 Id. at 812.
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Here, the difference between the philosophical approaches and legal
pragmatism becomes clear.  The balance struck from a compromise be-
tween making countries more equal and making countries more free
does not make the system effective.  The balance between freedom and
equality is an inescapable problem; the balance struck at a given time
is a product of the values of a society at that time.  If the WTO wants
to be a stable force promoting the rule of law in international trade
disputes, fairness should not depend on the relativistic interpretation
of the sum of the world’s values.  It must look inward and rely on the
principles it seeks to uphold, including predictability.
There are several specific ways to accomplish the above goals.
First is a mechanism for compulsory compensation.96  Potential devel-
oping nation complainants are often dissuaded by initial costs, so com-
pulsory compensation would require respondents to pay a minimal
“benefit-of-the-bargain” amount retroactive to the beginning of litiga-
tion.97  This would encourage developed nation respondents to be con-
servative and measured in their defenses and prevent them from
drowning developing nation complainants in expensive details.98
As for the panel process, the establishment of an independent
prosecutorial system to separate the administrative and judicial as-
pects could lead to more equitable treatment of issues.99  The current
system is more administrative than judicial, and consequently, there
is no reason for it to be treated as a civil litigation system, in which a
private party brings the suit.100  Some might argue that the DSB
might produce more equitable results if an independent party brings
the action; however, as seen in the United States, “[a]dministrative
agencies . . . conduct quasi-judicial hearings in which both the prosecu-
tor and the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) are technically within the
agency’s chain of command but in which neither is permitted to influ-
ence the court of the other’s work.”101  In fact, because of the growing
interconnectedness of the global trading world, it has become harder to
characterize an improper trade mechanism as harmful only to the
complaining nation.  Furthermore, the creation of public defenders
could lead to more equitable solutions for developing country respon-
dents in dispute settlement actions.102  Rather than replacing the re-
spondent party, this suggestion would simply assist in the great need
96 Id. at 835.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 837–38.
100 Id. at 839.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 839.
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to lessen the financial and time burdens faced by the respondent devel-
oping nations.
The other end of the process could use reform as well.  Stostad
argues that the DSU should require mandatory removal of trade barri-
ers deemed improper by the WTO.103  Currently, a winning complain-
ant might not win the removal of a harmful mechanism or even the
payment of appropriate compensation; instead, the WTO may give
them permission to implement an equally harmful mechanism against
the losing respondent.104  Other proposals have circulated, including a
mutual agreement among WTO members to cooperatively act against
a nation found in violation of a WTO agreement.105  As the WTO is not
an entity of its own but a collection of parts, it is important that these
parts are active enough to “[give] the WTO teeth.”106
2. Substantive Development and Transparency
Increasing participation by further regularizing the dispute
settlement process will clear up other issues in the pursuit of predict-
ability.  Regularization of the process should extend to the substantive
law of the WTO, with decisions made less on a case-by-case basis and
more by established legal standards.  By letting WTO principles more
freely develop as a common law rather than returning to the GATT
system of diplomatic decision-making, regularization would allow na-
tions to more easily predict the results of the procedure and act
preemptively to avoid a dispute.  Additionally, regularization would
decrease the need to cloud and hide the decisions of the DSB and in-
crease the need to publish and explain results, thus increasing the
transparency of the proceedings and increasing the predictability of
WTO proceedings.
Robert Hudec emphasizes the need for transparency to comple-
ment reform in other areas, particularly participation and better man-
agement of the DSB process.107  He notes that there have been
proposals put forward eliminating the confidentiality of many docu-
ments, opening DSB hearings to the general public, and those permit-
ting private individuals to submit briefs to both the panels and the
Appellate Body.108  For the United States and other advocates of in-
creased transparency, these proposals are important because they
would bring further legitimacy to the proceedings.109
103 Id. at 836.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 842.
106 Id. at 841.
107 Hudec, supra note 84.
108 Id.
109 Id.
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B. How: Politically
The WTO is, at heart, a political entity, not a judicial one.110  It
is not a government, but a collection of governments, and implement-
ing any reform should proceed with a view toward this existence.  For-
getting it is a political entity can create problems, but remembering
this can offer novel solutions.  The United States’ push for greater
transparency is but one example of the ways in which the dispute set-
tlement process can be reformed pragmatically, giving developing na-
tions tools to compete as equals.  In fact, if legal reform is going to
work, developing nations must reform politically.111  Asif Qureshi sug-
gests scrapping the DSU entirely and drafting a new agreement where
decisions are binding and where the WTO is authorized to monitor
compliance with such decisions.112  He suggests other reforms as well,
to ensure the procedures reach just results.113
Though this comment is about reforming the WTO, developing
nations should be aware of other ways to access the market and com-
pete fairly.  Regional and bilateral mechanisms are important to com-
plement participation in the international regime.  Whether it is
participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum discus-
sions or a free trade agreement with a fellow developing country, such
development not only increases the nation’s trade, but also helps de-
velop political capital that it can take to the world stage.  For instance,
in making economic allies regionally, a developing nation might have
more success in getting a decision of a dispute resolution panel imple-
mented if there are other nations that will support the developing na-
tion against a larger nation in violation of an international trade
obligation.  It should be cautioned that dependence on unilateral trade
policies is inherently illiberal and the policies unstable.114  Unilateral
policies should complement a multilateral approach.
Finally, the key pragmatic approach would allow choice appli-
cation of key philosophical reforms, but not for philosophical reasons.
The WTO should open the conversation about non-trade issues and
emphasize them, not only in dispute resolution proceedings, but
within the Doha Round negotiations.  Inclusion of non-trade issues
within formal WTO considerations is fair because it allows policies and
decisions to be created with greater foresight and lasting effect.  At the
same time, the WTO should resist the temptation to treat developing
nations differently because they characterize themselves as “develop-
110 That goes for the Dispute Resolution system as well.
111 Asif H. Qureshi, Participation of Developing Countries in the WTO Dispute Set-
tlement System, 47 J. AFR. L. 174 (2003).
112 Id. at 195–96.
113 Id.
114 Garcia, supra note 39, at 1031–32.
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ing.”  Outside philosophical concerns, such an approach would appreci-
ate the short-term effects of trade policies much more than the long-
term effects (considering current conditions without any incentive to
grow), and it does not appropriately treat poorer developed nations or
wealthier developing nations.  The proposed approach is fair because it
looks forward and appreciates the details.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where did this notion of fairness originate?  Because the WTO
dispute resolution system is a pseudo-adjudicative system, it dispenses
justice to the extent that the DSB acts as a court.  Courts apply the
law when it controls, and they do what is equitable, or fair, when the
law does not control.  Traditionally, fairness has been viewed a priori,
as a notion gaining its definition from outside the particular, subjec-
tive circumstances of a dispute.  Viewing the WTO and its dispute res-
olution system as a dispenser of a philosophical fairness is a consistent
view, but it is not concerned with what works best when formula and
reality divide.  What is misguided about a philosophical view is that it
puts the system in a vacuum and ignores all other political, economic,
and social forces that affect how the WTO can and does work.  Prag-
matic legalism views the WTO as merely one cog in the international
political economy—one that insists upon doing what works, not just
what should work.
To return to a question posed earlier, of what the members of
the WTO have consented to, it should be self-evident that the members
consented to a particular philosophical point of view.  It is likely that
the WTO and its dispute resolution process is intended to be a way of
predictably and efficiently resolving disputes where, hopefully, in the
future, panels might no longer be needed and nations could self-govern
knowing both how a dispute would come out if challenged and how to
avoid a problem becoming a dispute.
[N]o judicial system, no matter how well run, can avoid
the inevitable messiness of politics, and no system will
ever replace diplomacy. Nor should it . . . The WTO must
therefore . . . figure out how to improve its mechanisms
for negotiated solutions, and not automatically resort to
its judges.115
If liberalism is what the WTO strives for, then it is freedom in self-
governance that is its essence.
115 Susan Esserman & Robert Howse, The WTO on Trial, 82 FOREIGN AFF., 130,
140 (2003).
